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CHAPTER 2 
Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests 
GUY NEWHALL and EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
A. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION 
§2.1. One-year statute of limitations: Executrix's agreement to sell 
real estate. In Reilly v. Whitingl an executrix made an agreement to 
sell real estate, signing it "as executrix and individually." Suit was 
brought on the contract more than a year after its breach. The execu-
trix set up as a defense the one-year statute of limitations on actions on 
contracts made by an executor or administrator.2 The plaintiff's con-
tention was that since the agreement was signed "as executrix and in-
dividually" the defendant was still individually liable, even if the stat-
ute of limitations had run on her liability as executrix. The Court, 
however, took the view that the agreement was made by the defend-
ant in part as executrix and that the statute should apply. The fact 
that the words "and individually" were added could not, the Court 
felt, affect the result, since the defendant in any event was liable in-
dividually. The Court felt that the statute would be meaningless if it 
did not protect the defendant personally from acts done by her as ex-
ecutrix. 
The conclusion seems logical under the circumstances, since an ex-
ecutor, in most instances, is personally liable for his actions, and the 
clear intent of the legislature in such cases is that his liability be 
limited to one year. 
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the author of Settlement of Estates and Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts (3d ed. 
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§2.1. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 733, 127 N.E.2d 567. 
2 G.L., c. 260, §11. 
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§2.3 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 19 
§2.2. Effect of surviving spouse being declared sole heir. Some 
rather startling recent decisions have arisen out of the law providing 
that where a man dies intestate, leaving a widow but no issue and his 
total estate is less than $10,000, the widow becomes his sole heir.1 In 
Green v. Gilmore,2 decided during the 1954 SURVEY year, one fourth of 
a trust fund was held in trust for Edwin Gilmore to be paid to him in 
1956. If he died before that date it was to go to his heirs at law. He 
died in 1952, leaving a widow and a father and mother, but no issue. 
The Probate Court determined that Edwin's estate, exclusive of the 
trust, was less than $10,000, which made the widow the sole heir. Later 
the Probate Court decreed that as sole heir she was entitled to the 
whole of the trust fund, although it amounted to more than $15,000. 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decree. The Court 
stated that the will gave the trust fund to the heirs of Edwin, and by 
the decree of the Probate Court his widow was his sole heir at law. 
The fact that the trust fund exceeded $15,000 made no difference be-
cause the statutory limit on the widow's share applied only to the estate 
owned by Edwin and taken by descent from him. In its reasoning the 
Court followed Seavey v. O'Brien,S a somewhat similar case. 
The inference from the reasoning in this case is that if the $15,000 
had been unexpectedly discovered in Edwin's estate the decision 
would have been different. 
A question was also raised as to whether the accumulated income 
went to Edwin's estate or was part of the principal. The Court called 
attention to the terms of the will giving the trustees "absolute discre-
tion" in the matter of paying income to Edwin. Accordingly, accu-
mulated income became part of the principal. 
§2.3. Contested wills: Jury issues. The 1955 SURVEY year brought 
the usual crop of jury issue cases, the most significant of which was 
Wood v. McDonald.1 Except for a few small legacies, decedent left 
the bulk of her estate to her attorney-broth~r, who had drawn the will 
and was named its executor. Three sisters and a niece survived the 
decedent, in addition to the brother. They claimed undue influence 
and moved for the framing of jury issues. The probate judge denied 
the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court, stressing the fact 
that the framing of jury issues is discretionary, affirmed the decree. 
The Court stated that while the circumstances should be considered by 
the court with jealous scrutiny they were not conclusive on the ques-
tion of framing issues. 
Massachusetts decisions have consistently held that wills which pur-
port to confer substantial benefits on the attorney drafting them are to 
§2.2. 1 G.L., c. 190, §l. 
2331 Mass. 283, 118, N.E.2d 775 (1954). 
S 307 Mass. 33, 29 N.E.2d 196 (1940). 
§2.3. 1332 Mass. 220, 124 N.E.2d 264 (1955). 
I 
! 
! 
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20 1955 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §2.3 
be viewed with caution and extreme scrutiny. Reilly v. McAuliffe)2 
discussed in the 1954 SURVEYs was an example of this. In that case, a 
finding of undue influence by the probate judge was affirmed when the 
attorney received a substantial bequest under a codicil executed by 
the decedent ten days prior to her death. 
The difference between the two cases seems to be the fact that in 
Wood the attorney was related to the testatrix. 
On the other hand, in Morin v. Morin)4 another decision during the 
1955 SURVEY year, a finding by a jury of undue influence was upheld 
by the full Court in a case where most of the estate was given to one 
of the sons and the will was drawn in that son's office by a lawyer 
selected by him and where the testator had no independent advice. 
In Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Blaisdell 5 the Court reversed 
the decree of a probate judge allowing a motion to frame jury issues. 
The challenge here was directed to the testamentary capacity of the 
testatrix, who was seventy-nine years old when the will was executed. 
The contestants had offered to prove that the testatrix suffered from 
arteriosclerosis of the brain, a gradually developing disease, and that 
she had been admitted to a hospital in February, 1950. They also of-
fered to introduce a "prominent psychiatrist" who would testify, based 
on hospital records of the decedent's last illness and the testimony of 
other witnesses, that in his opinion the decedent was not competent to 
execute a will on July 7, 1949 (seven months prior to her admission to 
the hospital). To all this the Supreme Judicial Court said, "There is 
no direct evidence that the brain condition developed before early in 
1950. The evidence of peculiarities in behavior on which the contest-
ants rely is hardly sufficient to warrant an inference that she was not 
competent to make a will in July, 1949." 6 
As to the attitude of the Supreme Judicial Court on appeals from 
decrees granting or denying motions for jury issues, Justice Williams 
said, "It is the duty of this court to examine the statements of counsel 
received in lieu of evidence and to decide the case in accordance with 
its own judgment, giving due weight to the decision of the judge .... 
We recognize that weight should be given to the opinion of the trial 
judge, but the evidence expected to be offered is of such a character 
that in our opinion the order of the Probate Court should be re-
versed." 7 
The language used in Blaisdell seems a sharp contrast to the talk of 
the probate judge's discretion in Wood v. McDonald. It seems indica-
tive of a tendency on the part of the Court to examine more carefully 
2331 Mass. 144, Il7 N.E.2d 8Il (1954). 
s 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.4. 
4332 Mass. 223, 124 N.E.2d 251 (1955). 
51955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 801, 127 N.E.2d 796. 
61955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 806, 127 N.E.2d at 799. 
71955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 805, 807, 127 N.E.2d at 799, 800. 
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§2.4 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 21 
decisions allowing jury issues while leaving denials to the discretion of 
the probate judges. It all seems to be part of a general policy of not 
allowing the disappointed heir to use the courtroom as a forum to air 
the family's dirty linen, or forcing a settlement in his favor by threats 
to contest the will.7 
§2.4. Wills - Charitable bequests; Cy pres. In Mackey v. Bowen1 
the will gave the residue (about $40,000) to the "Church of the Infant 
Jesus of Brookline . . . for the purpose of erecting an altar to my 
memory and that of my wife, my father and mother, brothers and sis-
ters." The title to the church property was in the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Boston, a corporation sole. The church was a small 
temporary one, built as an offshoot from another parish, and the inten-
tion was to replace it with a larger church, a fact which the testator 
knew and favored. The executors filed a petition for instructions. 
The evidence showed that the cost of an altar might be small or large, 
according to the funds available. The will contained a clause stating 
that the testator purposely gave nothing to his relatives. The heirs 
claimed that the case should be remanded to the Probate Court to see 
if the corporation sole would accept the gift and what the altar would 
cost, the surplus, if any, over the cost, or the whole if the gift was not 
accepted, to be distributed among the heirs. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the gift was a valid charitable gift, notwithstanding it 
was intended as a memorial, and that acceptance of a legacy is pre-
sumed until unequivocal renunciation. In this case the answer of the 
Archbishop showed that it would be accepted. The Court stated that 
there was no occasion for an order for cy pres at that time. That ques-
tion would arise if it appeared that all the money was not spent for the 
altar. However, it would not be difficult to discover a general chari-
table intent where the testator expressly excluded his relatives. 
In this case, the Court said, since it was understood that a new 
church was to be built and it was uncertain what the altar would cost 
and when it would be built, the Court should not remake the will by 
introducing limitations as to amount or time. Further, while executors 
are entitled to instructions, it is only as to their present duties. In this 
case, if the legatee accepts they should pay the legacy to it, with no con-
cern as to future contingencies. The proper use of the funds given to 
a public charity would be a concern of the Attorney General.2 
In First Christian Church v. Brownell3 certain funds were held in 
7 Fuller v. Sylvia, 240 Mass. 49, 133 N.E. 384 (1921). 
§2.4. 1332 Mass. 167, 124 N.E.2d 254 (1955). 
2 See Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955), where 
a petition for mandamus to compel the Attorney General to allow use of his name 
. in a suit to enforce the terms of a public charitable trust was dismissed for lack of 
standing to sue on the part of the petitioner. For an examination of the decision, 
see the discussion at § 18.3 infra. 
3332 Mass. 143, 123 N.E.2d 603 (1955). 
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trust for the church. In 1941 the church voted to close, and appointed 
a committee to turn over the property to the Massachusetts Congrega-
tional Conference, of which it was a part. The proceedings in this 
case were five different petitions by the church, each asking that a cer-
tain fund be applied cy pres. The Attorney General and the heirs, 
etc., of the various donors or testators were made respondents. As to 
four of the funds and part of the fifth the judge found that there was 
no general charitable intent on the part of the donors and therefore 
the funds should not be applied cy pres, but reverted to the heirs, lega-
tees, etc., of the donors or testators. The Conference appealed, and the 
real question at issue was its right to appeal. The Court dismissed the 
appeals on the ground that the Conference was not an aggrieved party 
and had no right of appeal. An organization which hopes to be the 
beneficiary of cy pres has no private interest, no interest differing in 
kind from that of the public generally, which is represented exclusively 
by the Attorney General. Hence it has no standing to appeal. 
§2.5. Residuary clause: Deficiency of assets; Interest on legacies. 
The case of Sibley v. Livermore1 presented several interesting prob-
lems. It was a petition by a testamentary trustee for instructions, and 
was an aftermath of the earlier case of Smith v. Livermore,2 involv-
ing the same will. The will contained 221 clauses. Clause 211 gave 
$400,000 to trustees to pay the income to the testator's niece Mary for 
life. On her death the fund was to be "divided in accordance with the 
residuary clause of this will." Clause 219 provided that if the estate 
was insufficient to pay the legacies in full, the legacies in trust and 
those for $5000 or more should be preferred; and that all estate and 
inheritance taxes should be paid from the residue. 
The estate was not sufficient to pay even the preferred legacies in 
full, and in accordance with the decree in the earlier case the executors 
paid all the preferred legatees, including the trust at issue in this case, 
91 percent of their legacies, less the Massachusetts inheritance taxes on 
each one. Nothing was paid to either the deferred or the residuary 
legatees. 
After the death of the life tenant in 1954, the trust fund, originally 
$352,000, was liquidated for $585,000. Out of this were to come the 
expenses of distribution, income taxes on gains, and Massachusetts in-
heritance taxes on the amounts to be distributed to legatees. Exclu-
sive of this trust it would take about $168,000 to make up for the 9 
percent not paid to the preferred legatees and to reimburse them for 
the inheritance taxes. The deferred legacies, not paid at all, totaled 
$124,000. 
The residuary legatees argued that they were entitled by the terms of 
the will to the remainder after Mary's death. but the Court held that 
the clause in the trust providing for distribution in accordance with 
§2.5. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 717. 128 N.E.2d 329. 
2298 Mass. 223. 10 N.E.2d 117 (1937). 
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§2.6 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 23 
the residuary clause did not operate to make gifts after the death of the 
life tenant to the persons named in the residuary clause. What it 
meant was that the remainder after the life tenant's death was to be 
treated as part of the residue. As such it was subject to the payment of 
deficiencies in the pecuniary legacies, deferred as well as preferred, in 
priority to payments to the residuary legatees. The use of the word 
"divided" instead of "distributed" did not show any different inten-
tion. In the earlier case the Court had made a similar ruling as to 
a trust where the life tenant predeceased the testator. The trustee 
should be instructed to pay over the balance to himself as executor. 
The petition was by the trustee, and the Court held that as executor 
he could not be given instructions asked for as trustee. As no one ob-
jected, however, the Court would give him the instructions on the as-
sumption that he would amend the petition by naming himself as sur-
viving executor and surviving trustee. 
On this basis the executor was instructed to pay first the 9 percent 
deficiency in the preferred legacies, except the deficiency in the 
$400,000 trust for Mary, less the Massachusetts. inheritance taxes and 
with 4 percent interest from one year after the testator's death. Next 
he should pay principal and interest of the deferred legacies, less in-
heritance taxes. Inheritance taxes were to be paid out of the residue, 
but could not be paid until the residue was established. Once a resi-
due was established all legatees would be reimbursed for the taxes de-
ducted from their legacies. There was no priority among the lega-
tees as to taxes. If the estate was not sufficient to pay the deferred 
legacies, with interest, or to reimburse the legatees for the taxes, the 
amount available should be prorated. 
The petitioner also requested instructions as to a deduction to 
which he was entitled from the tax assessed on the capital gains by vir-
tue of the fact that many of the legatees were nonresidents, but the 
Court refused on the ground that equity will not interfere to deter-
mine the validity of a tax. 
§2.6. Bequest to the person named as trustee. The case of Zeltser-
man v. Woodsl raised an interesting question, probably new to most at-
torneys. The will gave the estate to a trustee for the benefit of the 
testatrix's mother for life. On her death what remained of the trust 
fund was bequeathed to Herbert Brigham if then living, and, if not, to 
Stanley Field. Herbert was named executor and trustee, but if he was 
unable or did not desire to serve, Stanley was named in his place. 
The mother predeceased the testatrix, so no trustee was appointed. 
Both Herbert and Stanley survived the testatrix, but both declined to 
serve as executors and the petitioners were appointed administrators 
c.t.a. The probate judge ordered the estate to be distributed to Her-
bert, and the contesting heirs at law appealed, claiming that it went as 
§2.6. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 773, 127 N.E.2d 667. 
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24 1955 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §2.7 
intestate property. Their contention was that the bequest to Herbert 
was intended only as compensation for his services as trustee, and, as 
he did not serve, the bequest failed and there was an intestacy. This 
contention was based on the early case of Kirkland v. Narramore,2 
which held that where bequests are made to individuals in the charac-
ter of executors and trustees, and not as marks of personal regard 
only, they are given on the implied condition that the persons serve 
in the character intended; and that bequests to individuals who are ex-
ecutors are prima facie considered to be given to them in that charac-
ter, unless the presumption is repelled by the nature of the legacies or 
other circumstances. 
The Court affirmed the decree of the Probate Court giving the estate 
to Herbert. The reasoning of the Court was that the legacy was given 
to him by name and not as trustee. Also it was provided that, if he 
did not desire to serve, Stanley was to serve in his place, but Stanley 
received no legacy for serving if Herbert was living. It seemed plain 
that the testatrix had personal reasons for making the bequest. Also it 
was unlikely that she would have given her entir!,! estate as compensa-
tion for what might be only a brief term as trustee. In the Kirkland 
case the bequest was for a definite amount to the "above trustee" and 
was followed by other bequests. A will is to be construed so as to ef-
fect what is believed to be the testator's intention, and an intestacy is 
to be avoided if possible. In this case sufficient evidence appeared to 
show that the testatrix intended Herbert to have the legacy irrespec-
tive of any services by him as trustee. 
§2.7. Creation of a trust. In Gordon v. Gordon/ the Court was 
called on to construe the will of Yetta Gordon devising her house in 
the following language: "It is my wish that my home in Attleboro re-
main intact and that any of my children be allowed to stay there when-
ever they wish, and for this reason I devise said property and be-
queath the entire contents of the house, except for the specific bequests 
herein mentioned, to my daughter, Minerva Gordon, and my son, Har-
old B. Gordon. If at any time said Minerva Gordon and Harold B. 
Gordon shall decide to sell the home and live elsewhere, the home shall 
be sold and the proceeds divided equally among my children in ac-
cordance with the terms of the residuary clause of this will." 
At testatrix' death, Minerva and Harold were her only unmarried 
children and the only ones still living in Attleboro. After her death, 
the united family she had known divided into two antagonistic fac-
tions, and since 1950 none of the children have lived in the house. 
2105 Mass. 31 (1870). 
§2.7. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 124 N.E.2d 226. Another case involving the Gordon 
family is discussed in §11.4 infra. The case there discussed involves a condition in 
a will that a legatee forfeit his interest if he marry outside a particular religious 
faith. The will was upheld. Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States 
was denied. 
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§2.9 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 25 
Minerva and three of her sisters brought a petition for declaratory re-
lief. They contended that Minerva and Harold held the house in trust 
for all six of the children, that the trust had failed and should be termi-
nated by a sale of the house and a division of the proceeds. The re-
spondent Harold contended that he and Minerva owned the house as 
tenants in common. The Court held that a trust was created, stating 
that "although the particular word does not appear, the existence of a 
trust does not depend upon the terminology used." 2 The Court was 
not concerned with whether or not the testatrix knew what a trust was 
or intended one had she fully understood. The pivotal factor was her 
intent, as gleaned from a reading of the entire will. If carrying out 
her expressed intent required a trust, a trust would be declared. 
However, the family feud which developed after the mother's death 
made it impractical for the children to live together under the same 
roof. Accordingly the Court held that the purpose of the trust had 
failed and ordered the trust to be terminated, the property sold, and 
the proceeds divided in accordance with the will. 
§2.8. Implied trusts: Joint contributions to a bank account. In 
Tenczar v. Tenczar1 there was a petition by a wife separated from her 
husband claiming that a bank account standing in his name was the re-
sult of their joint efforts and should be shared equally by them. From 
a decree of the probate judge in the wife's favor the husband appealed. 
From the judge's finding of facts it appeared that the account was 
opened by the husband in his own name. Both husband and wife 
worked and their salaries were turned over to the wife. She paid the 
household expenses and deposited the balance in this and another ac-
count. (The other account had been divided under a decree of the 
court at the time the husband obtained a decree that he was living 
apart for justifiable cause.) The judge ruled that the account had 
been accumulated by their joint efforts and should be equally divided. 
On appeal the decree was reversed. The mere fact that the wife 
contributed to an account in the husband's name did not give rise to a 
trust. When a husband or wife pays money or transfers property to 
the other, there is no presumption that it is received in trust. If a 
trust is alleged to exist, it must be proved. In the absence of such 
proof, it must be deemed that the money, property, or conveyance 
was received with the intention that it be applied to the use and benefit 
of either or both at the discretion of the recipient. The same principle 
would apply where the wife contributes money towards the purchase 
of real estate in the husband's name. She must show that she contrib-
uted a definite sum for the whole or an exact share of the property. 
§2.9. Removal of trustee. As an aftermath to the cases involving 
the Gordon family discussed in Section 2.7, a petition was brought by 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 51, 124 N.E.2d at 227. 
§2.8. 1332 Mass. 105, 123 N.E.2d 359 (1954). 
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the same four sisters for the removal of Harold Gordon as trustee un-
der his father's will.1 The petition alleged that he "has improperly 
and wrongfully misused and abused and is continuing to misuse and 
abuse his position, authority, and power as trustee for his own use and 
advantage ... " 2 Evidence was introduced of an apparently constant 
switching of funds among Harold Gordon, the Estate of Joseph Gor-
don, and the Interstate Transit Corporation, the family business. The 
probate judge found the pleadings unsupported by the evidence and 
dismissed the petition. The petitioners appealed. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Wilkins, found it unneces-
sary to review the evidence. Instead, it took judicial notice of its own 
prior proceedings3 and removed Harold as trustee on the sole basis 
that he is no longer a beneficiary of the trust. "We think," said the 
Court, "that the testator would not have wanted him to continue as 
trustee in these circumstances, that it would not be for the best inter-
ests of the trust that he remain as trustee." 4 
§2.10. Charitable corporations: Qualifying as trustee. American 
lnsitute of Architects v. Attorney General l was a petition for a declar-
atory judgment to determine if it was necessary for the petitioner to 
be appointed trustee and qualify by giving bond in order to receive a 
legacy. The will gave the residue to the American Institute of Archi-
tects, of Washington, D. C., upon certain trusts and conditions, chiefly 
to provide scholarships and financial assistance to deserving students 
of architecture, and so forth. The capital was to be kept inviolate as 
long as the American Institute of Architects should endure, and not be 
transferred or distributed unless the American Institute of Architects 
ceased to exist. In that event it should be transferred to some organi-
zation most fitted to maintain the fund and carry out the trust. The 
general purposes of the Institute, as set forth in its charter, were sub-
stantially the same as those set forth in the will. The Court held that 
the Institute did not take upon a technical trust, but upon a quasi 
trust. Title to the gift vested in it upon a restriction that it be used 
only in the manner and for the purposes expressed in the will. Ac-
cordingly the executor could transfer the securities to the Institute di-
rectly and without the necessity that it qualify as trustee. 
§2.11. Statutory changes. A 1955 statu tel recognizes the new so-
called "certified mail." Wherever the statutes or rules require that no-
§2.9. 1 332 Mass. 2lO, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 67, 124 N.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 
947 (1955). 
2 Record, p. 1. 
3 See Assessors of Lawrence v. Arlington Mills, 320 Mass. 272, 69 N.E.2d 2 (1946); 
Matter of Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946); Matter of Keenan, 314 
Mass. 544, 50 N.E.2d 785 (1943). 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 69, 124 N.E.2d at 237. 
§2.lO. 1 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 579, 127 N.E.2d 161. 
§2.11. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 683, amending G.L., c. 4, §7. 
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§2.12 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 27 
tices in probate proceedings be sent by registered mail it is now per-
missible to use "certified mail" instead. 
The legislature in 1955 passed a new statute2 providing a substan-
tial increase in the fees payable in the Probate Court. The statute 
also did away with the free copies of wills, decrees, and the like. In 
other words, there is now a fee payable for nearly everything that is 
filed or taken away. The most important item in the increase of fees 
had to do with probate accounts. There is now a filing fee of $5 for 
each year or major portion of a year that the account covers. This 
was modified by a later statute3 providing that there shall be no filing 
fee if the amount covered by the account is less than $1000. 
B. FUTURE INTERESTS 
§2.12. Life estates and future interests in personalty: Accounting 
by executor. It appears to be well settled that there can be valid gifts 
over after life estates in tangible personal property. With some possi-
ble exceptions because of the nature of the subject matter and the 
types of estates that may be created in chattels,l most of the American 
cases permit the creation of the same kinds of interests in a chattel as 
may be created in land.2 
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Swift 3 the testator bequeathed tangible 
personal property (under the value of $4000) to his wife "to have, hold 
and enjoy during her life." This property was to go to certain rela-
tives if they survive the wife, and, if they did not, it was to pass to 
any deceased relative's issue by right of representation. There was a 
clause providing that the wife should hold a life estate in the personal 
property without liability for waste and without an obligation to in-
sure. The executor delivered the personalty to the widow and then 
filed a first and final account showing such distribution. The Probate 
Court allowed the account as a first account only, apparently on the 
ground that the title was in the executor, where it would remain until 
the life beneficiary died. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed this decree and ordered the allowance of the account as a first 
and final account. 
The Court did not find it necessary to concern itself with the techni-
cality of the complete state of the title in the chattels after the executor 
delivered them to the widow. The question before it was whether the 
executor had fulfilled all his duties with respect to the property when 
2 Id., c. 418, amending G.L.. c. 262. §40. 
3Id., c. 744. modifying c. 418. which amended G.L.. c. 262, by repealing §40 and 
inserting a new one. 
§2.12. 1 E.g., estates tail cannot be created in personalty, and there cannot be 
any life estates and gifts over if the subject matter is consumable. 
2 See 1 American Law of Property §4.4 (1952). 
3331 Mass. 755. 122 N.E.2d 757 (1954). 
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it was turned over to the wife so as to relieve himself of any further 
accounting. In concluding that he completed distribution on delivery 
to the life beneficiary, the Court emphasized that the will gave her full 
control over the property, without her having to give security. The 
Court pointed out that since the testator relieved her from liability for 
waste and failure to insure, his intent must have been to give the re-
maindermen only that which would be left at the expiration of the life 
estate. It was noted that there was nothing in the will from which it 
could be implied that the testator contemplated a duty on the part of 
his personal representative to take charge of the property when the 
wife died. The remaindermen would be entitled to the possession of 
the chattels on the death of the life tenant without the necessity of fur-
ther action by the executor.4 It was not considered significant that 
some of the remaindermen could not be ascertained until the life es-
tate terminated. 
§2.13. Construction: Preference for early vesting. During the 1955 
SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court in Old Colony Trust Com-
pany v. Clemensl relied heavily on the rule that the early vesting of re-
mainders is to be favored. Alfred W. Smith created a trust reserving 
the unlimited power to alter, amend, and revoke it. The income was 
made payable after his death to his wife for life. A subsequent para-
graph provided: 
In the event, however, that my said wife shall not be living at the 
time of my decease, or if living at my decease, after the death of 
my said wife, the said trustee shall pay over, free and clear of all 
trusts, the principal sum of said trust estate to my nieces and 
nephew in equal portions, share and share alike and to the issue 
of any deceased niece or nephew by right of representation. 
The settlor included his stepniece as a beneficiary of the corpus. The 
Court was asked to decide whether the recipients of the corpus should 
be determined as of the date of the creation of the trust, at the death 
of the settlor, or when the life beneficiary died at which time the prin-
cipal became distributable. 
The Court held that the remainder interests vested on the death of 
the settlor, and the nieces and nephews living at that time were en-
titled to a share in the corpus even though they might not later survive 
the period of distribution. It reasoned that, since the settlor reserved 
the power to revise and revoke the trust, he did not intend that the 
remainders vest before his death. The Court also could have empha-
sized that no beneficiary, including his wife, was to benefit until Mr. 
Smith died. In selecting the date of settlor's death instead of his wife's 
death as the critical date on which the remainders became indefeasi-
4 See Crean v. McMahon, 106 Md. 507, 68 Atl. 265 (1907). 
§2.13. l332 Mass. 535, 126 N.E.2d 193 (1955). 
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ble, the preference for the early vesting of remainders was considered 
decisive. The Court stated that Lyons v. Lyons2 and Barker v. Monks3 
were controlling, noting that those cases differed in that remainder-
men were lineal descendants of the donor4 but did not think that this 
difference was significant, since Lyons) Barker and Clemens all in-
volved gifts to blood relatives. 
Relative to the question whether the direction to the trustee to pay 
over the trust principal at the death of the life tenant settled the pe-
riod at which the vesting was to take place, the Court said that these 
words are commonly used to give formal authority to distribute trust 
funds and rarely indicate any further intent. The strict application of 
the so-called "divide and pay over" rule5 was rejected in line with ear-
lier cases to the effect that such language by itself is not enough to im-
ply a condition of survivorship.6 
It seems that one of the most forceful arguments raised in support 
of the contention that only those who answered the description of 
nieces and nephews at the time of division of the trust fund were to 
take was made when it was called to the attention of the Court that 
treating the gifts as vested on the death of the donor had the effect of 
passing the trust property to persons who were not his blood relatives. 
Some of the nephews and nieces died after the settlor and before the 
wife, and, as a result, their personal representatives were entitled to 
their property to distribute according to the provisions of a will or un-
der intestacy laws. The Court stated that this was a possibility when-
ever there was an interval between the times of vesting and distribu-
tion, and said: "The contention suggests a reason for doubting the 
wisdom of the rule for preferring early vesting but not a reason for 
denying the applicability of the rule in the present case." 7 
If it was the desire of the donor to benefit his blood relatives only, it 
may be doubted that a broad rule of construction should frustrate such 
wish. The policy expediting the vesting of future interests did not 
prevent the Court from finding that the remainders were subject to 
an implied condition that the holders survive the donor. Apparently, 
then, a "positive" declaration of intent is not essential to render the 
rule inapplicable. If the donative scheme appears to prefer relatives 
to others, the wisdom of the application of the rule to benefit others 
may be doubted. 
2313 Mass. 550, 48 N .E.2d 18 (1943). 
3315 Mass. 620, 53 N .E.2d 696 (1944). 
4 "We find nothing in the language of the will that can overcome the preference 
of the law for vested remainders - a preference that is especially strong where the 
remainders are to children of the testator." 313 Mass. at 552, 48 N.E.2d at 19. 
5 See In re Crane, 164 N.Y. 71, 58 N.E. 47 (1900); 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests 
§§393, 394 (1936); 3 Restatement of Property §260. 
6 Barker v. Monks, 315 Mass. 620, 53 N.E.2d 696 (1944); Brown v. Spring, 241 Mass. 
565, 135 N.E. 701 (1922). 
71955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 469, 126 N.E.2d at 196. 
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It has been suggested that the preference for vested interests has 
doubtful validity in this day and age.8 The contingent remainder is 
no longer subject to the common law destructibility rule; it is more 
freely alienable than earlier and may in certain circumstances be 
reached by creditors. It is also probable that the average donor thinks 
more in terms of enjoyment and possession of the trust res than in 
terms of vesting. Moreover, in view of adverse tax consequences and 
administration expense problems that may be present if remainders 
are vested,9 it is believed that most grantors would desire to postpone 
vesting until the time for distribution. 
§2.14. Construction: Income payable t.o brothers of testator and in 
case of their death to their heirs; Implied condition of survivorship. 
A gift to A for the life of B creates in A an estate pur autre vie which 
is vested and which will pass to A's personal representative on his 
death.1 On the other hand, a bequest to A for the life of B and if A 
dies then to C, would seem to give A an interest which is not devisable 
or descendible. • 
In December, 1954, the Supreme Judicial Court had to interpret a 
provision in a will somewhat similar to the above limitation in the 
case of Boston Safe Deposit &- Trust Co. v. Northey.2 There T died 
testate giving the residue in trust to pay income up to $2500 annually 
to A for life. The rest of the income was payable during A's life in 
equal shares to T's three brothers, "and in case of the death of any of 
said brothers his share of said income to be paid to his heirs." B, a 
brother of T, survived T, but predeceased A, leaving a will. The trus-
tee sought instructions as to whom B's share of the income must be 
paid. 
The Court, rejecting the contention that B's interest in the income 
was indefeasibly vested, decided that it was payable to his heirs as 
long as A lived. The Court announced: "The general rule is that 
where the payment of income to a person is not limited in terms to the 
life of a beneficiary but is limited to some other lawful period of time, 
and before the expiration of that period the beneficiary dies, his per-
sonal representative is entitled to the income for the remainder of the 
period." II This rule of construction was thought to be somewhat arbi-
trary, and the Court refused to apply it in this case where the contin-
gency of death could be referred to a time other than the life of the 
testator. The bequest of income to B was limited to A's lifetime, and 
his death was not certain to occur before A's. The language of contin-
85 American Law of Property §2l.3 (1952). 
D See Casner, Estate Planning 192, 193 (1953); 5 American Law of Property §21.3 
(1952). 
§2.14. 1 Hussey v. Hussey, 323 Mass. 533, 535, 83 N.E.2d 159 (1948); Harrison 
v. Marden. 298 Mass. 148, 150. 10 N.E.2d 109 (1937). 
2332 Mass. 1l0. 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 989, 123 N.E.2d 365. 
II 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 991, 123 N.E.2d at 366. 
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gency relates more reasonably to the date of expiration of the life es-
tate than the death of the donor. The Court did not permit the policy 
for early vesting of interests to interfere with this more reasonable in-
terpretation. 
§2.15. Construction: Gift to B or his issue; Implied condition of 
survivorship. Restatement of Property §252 provides: "In a limitation 
purporting to create a remainder or an executory interest, in ... B 
or his issue ... the alternative form tends to establish as to the inter-
est of B that (a) a requirement of survival to the end of all preceding 
interests exists; and (b) such survival is a condition precedent of 
such interest." In the Comment that follows this section of the Re-
statement it is said: 
The use of the disjunctive "or" ... tends to establish the intent 
of conveyor that a choice be made at some time between Band 
the potential takers under the rest of the limitation. The further 
fact that there are interests prior to the interests created or at-
tempted to be created by the quoted limitation affords, in the du-
ration of such prior interests, a reasonable and convenient post-
ponement of the making of this choice. Survival by B for this 
period of postponed choice justifies the stated constructional tend-
ency to exclude completely the potential takers under the balance 
of the limitation. 
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Barkerl the Supreme Judicial Court ob-
served the rule stated in Section 252 and the Comment thereon in de-
ciding the case. The testator left the residuary estate in trust to pay 
the income to his wife for life and on her death the principal was to 
be paid to certain named beneficiaries, including a cousin. The trus-
tee was also directed to pay over to him "or in case of his death to 
his issue by right of representation, the sum of ... $10,000." The 
cousin was also to receive an additional $20,000 in the event the wife 
did not survive the testator or if they died in a common calamity. 
The cousin survived the testator but died before the wife, leaving four 
children. After quoting Section 252 as applicable, the Court held that 
the $10,000 gift was payable to the children instead of the legal repre-
sentative of his estate. 
This holding was fortified by a look at the $20,000 legacy, which, if 
the wife had predeceased the testator, would have been payable to the 
cousin if he survived the donor, and, if he did not, to his children by 
virtue of the local anti-lapse statute. The language of the $10,000 gift 
seemingly was designed to bring about a like result. 
§2.16. Construction: Life estate or absolute interest. It often hap-
pens that a testator desires to give the primary object of his bounty full 
control over property and what remains unconsumed to pass to an-
other. The effectiveness of such a plan seems to depend on the ques-
§2.l5. l332 Mass. 533, 126 N.E.2d 188 (1955). 
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tion whether the first taker received a fee simple or absolute interest, 
or whether he obtained a life estate or a life interest with a power to 
consume. The source of any difficulty in carrying out the apparent 
wishes of testators who set up such schemes appears to be the ancient 
common law tendency to classify estates into rigid invariable types. 
In Massachusetts the unfortunate precedent of the early case of Ide 
v. Idel has on occasion been used to frustrate what appeared to be the 
obvious wishes of donors.:! In that case, property was devised to tes-
tator's son, Peleg, and to his heirs and assigns forever. The will went 
on to provide, "and further it is my will, that if my son Peleg shall 
die, and leave no lawful heirs, what estate he shall have, to be equally 
divided between my son John Ide, and my guardian Nathaniel Ide, to 
them and their heirs forever." 
It was held that Peleg took a fee simple absolute, and the Court 
said: 
Whenever, therefore, it is the clear intention of the testator that 
the devisee shall have an absolute property in the estate devised, a 
limitation over must be void, because it is inconsistent with the 
absolute property supposed in the first devise. And a right in the 
first devisee to dispose of the estate devised at his pleasure, and 
not a mere power of specifying who may take, amounts to an un-
qualified gift.s 
Since the first taker was given absolute power over the property de-
vised, the subsequent attempt to derogate from the gift was useless. 
This emphasis on formalism conflicts with the apparent intent of the 
testator. This being so, is there any reason for the continued exist-
ence of the rule of Ide v. Ide? In Frost v. Hunter4 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court stated that the rule is "indispensable to the required cer-
tainty and security in establishing titles to property and especially in 
the disposition of landed estates, and that it is a safer rule than one 
which, for want of strictures, would be attended in its application 
with all sorts and shades of doubt and uncertainty." 5 However, in ex-
perience, the rule of Ide v. Ide instead of making titles secure has led 
to much litigation,6 since it is doubtful that it corresponds with the de-
sires of the ordinary donor. 
The Supreme Judicial Court refused to apply the Ide doctrine in 
Morris v. Smith,7 saying " ... we are not disposed to follow Ide v. Ide 
§2.l6. I 5 Mass. 500 (1809). 
2 See O'Reilly v. Irving, 284 Mass. 522, 188 N.E. 253 (1933); Martin, The Rule of 
Ide v. Ide: An Anachronism in Massachusetts Law, 30 B.U.L. Rev. 161 (1950). 
S 5 Mass. at 504. 
4312 Mass. 16, 42 N.E.2d 820 (1942). 
1\ 312 Mass. at 20, 42 N.E.2d at 822. 
6 See Martin, The Rule of Ide v. Ide: An Anachronism in Massachusetts Law, 
30 B.U.L. Rev. 161 (1950). 
7332 Mass. 34, 123 N.E.2d 212 (1954). 
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. . . or any other cases. . . in so far as they appear to hold any limita-
tion may be put upon the probate court or of this Court to consider 
the will as a whole as it is contained in its four corners and the cir-
cumstances under which it was executed." The will before the Court 
in the third paragraph gave testatrix's mother all her real and personal 
property. The fourth paragraph devised and bequesthed certain 
property to named persons «[i]n the event that the death of [testatrix's 
mother] occurs before my own death, or at the death [of the 
mother] ... " The Court thought that the natural import of the lan-
guage indicated that the mother was intended to get a life estate only 
especially in light of circumstances attending the execution of the will. 
It was pointed out that testatrix's mother was eighty-four years old 
when the will was executed and had acquired property by right of sur-
vivorship which with her own would adequately take care of her dur-
ing her remaining years. 
§2.17. Construction: Class gifts; Meaning of the word "wish"; Rule 
Against Perpetuities. Where there is an immediate gift to a class, the 
class, closes at the date of testator's death.1 If the enjoyment of the gift 
is postponed by the intervention of a preceding estate, the class closes at 
the expiration of the prior estate.2 These two propositions are partiC-
ularizations of a general rule of construction, sometimes called a rule 
of convenience,S that class membership is determined at the period of 
distribution. If a donor manifests a desire to benefit a group of per-
sons at a certain time, only those answering the description of the 
group at the time of division of the property should share. Other-
wise, it would be extremely awkward to benefit the individuals in the 
class at the time intended and yet keep enough property back for fu-
ture division among those who could be described as class members in 
the future. 
In Crockett v. Crockett 4 the seventh clause of a will read: "To all 
of my nieces and nephews, I wish that my estate would provide a four-
year college course to any wishing to accept such." This was followed 
by a clause dividing the residuary estate into equal parts among the 
testator's mother, wife, and son. A Probate Court decision that the 
seventh clause created no valid legacies in the nephews and nieces was 
appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decree stating that the leg-
acies to the nieces and nephews were direct and present gifts. There 
being no preceding estate, there was nothing to indicate that the en-
joyment of the legacy of each donee was to increase or diminish by 
the number of nieces and nephews who survived him. The testator 
really thought of them as individuals rather than a group. 
§2.l7. 1 Worcester v. Worcester, 101 Mass. 128 (1869). 
22 Simes, Law of Future Interests §378 (1936). 
S Ibid. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 489, 126 N.E.2d 363. 
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It was argued that since the testator had no niece, he must have de-
sired to include a niece who might have been born beyond the period 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities. If this were his intent the entire gift 
would fail. However, the Court rejected this contention, declaring 
that the postponement of payment to nieces and nephews born in the 
future would be at variance with the donor's testamentary scheme. It 
would be inconsistent with his desire to educate the beneficiaries who 
were now in existence; and it would conflict with his apparent intent 
to benefit his mother, wife, and son, since the residuary gift to them 
could not be computed until the amount required for the legacies for 
the purpose of education had first been settled. 
The Court gave the word "wish" more than a purely precatory 
meaning. The will did not name an executor or a trustee. The ex-
pression is the equivalent to a command when it is used to declare 
what disposition is to be made of the decedent's property. It is unlike 
the situation where there is a bequest to a certain person followed by 
an expression of donor's wish that the legatee makes some further dis-
position.1S 
5 Compare Knibbs v. Knibbs, 236 Mass. 182, 127 N.E. 885 (1920); Pitts v. Milton, 
192 Mass. 88, 77 N.E. 203 (1906); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101, 51 N.E. 449 
(1898). 
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